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Summary
This paper seeks to resolve the problem of redefining cultural boundaries. Therefore, the 
following questions are addressed: 1) To what do cultural boundaries refer, and of what 
do they basically consist? 2) On what conditions and to what extent is the metaphor of 
cultural boundaries appropriate? 3) On what conditions can cultural boundaries be broken 
or crossed? These questions are examined based on a philosophical analysis that draws 
from Dave Elder-Vass’s The Reality of Social Construction (2012) and Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (2003). As a major result, it is shown that the metaphor 
of boundaries is an appropriate tool for cultural studies, insofar as it helps to explain why 
different norms are followed in different cultures, and how cultural conflicts are related 
to breaking of norms endorsed and enforced by different social groups. The metaphor of 
boundaries fits this task, because with the help of it different cultures and social groups 
can be structured and represented as distinct collective entities, yet with blurred and 
changing borders, that can side, collide, and overlap with each other.
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The questions to be addressed
This paper seeks to resolve the problem of redefining cultural boundaries. Therefore, 
the following questions are addressed: 1) To what do cultural boundaries refer, and of 
what do they basically consist? 2) On what conditions and to what extent is the metaphor 
of cultural boundaries appropriate? 3) On what conditions can cultural boundaries be 
broken or crossed? I examine these and other related questions based on a philosophical 
analysis that draws from Dave Elder-Vass’s The Reality of Social Construction (2012) and 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (2003). Elder-Vass combines 
a philosophical analysis of the concepts of cultural studies with the perspective of sociology 
of culture and introduces the novel idea of norm circles which is a powerful tool for 
analyzing the issues of cultural encounters. MacIntyre, for his part, discusses requirements 
for cultural understanding and strongly criticizes relativism that questions the possibility 
of making valid truth claims from within any one tradition. For this paper, MacIntyre’s 
view is relevant because it keeps the doors for cultural comparisons open and thus unlocks 
(real or imaginary) boundaries between different cultures. This paper provides a clear 
understanding of the basis of cultural differences and of transcending cultural boundaries 
through building on and expanding the ideas presented by Elder-Vass and MacIntyre.
The notion of cultural boundaries
In his novel Things Fall Apart (1958), Chinua Achebe describes the clash of the tribal 
culture of the Igbos of Nigeria and the colonial culture of British Christian missionaries 
at the end of the nineteenth century. The cultures begin to blend when the white men 
come and try to communicate and live together with tribespeople. The novel explains how 
cultures with different ideas and beliefs can clash and be intolerant toward one another. 
Much of the theme is developed through the main character, Okonkwo, and his struggle 
against fear and anger. Throughout the book, Okonkwo tries to resolve the problems that 
develop all around him and within himself. As the story progresses, conflict overwhelms 
Okonkwo and leads to the downfall of his own culture and that of the Igbo tribespeople. 
In the light of this, Achebe’s novel presents a gloomy example of a cultural encounter 
(Lehtonen, 2015, p. 47).
In general, cultural conflicts can take place in one of two main ways both of which 
are presented in Achebe’s novel. In the first way, the representatives of a culture (e.g., 
missionaries) do not acknowledge the cultural value and rights of another group, but 
instead forbid and prevent—with threats and bribes—traditions, practices, and customs 
of the group concerned. Colonialism (i.e., the exploitation of peoples by other peoples) 
and terrorism (for example motivated by religion) are extreme forms of this type of 
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cultural conflict. In the second way, traditions, practices, and customs of one culture are 
peacefully, and even inadvertently, replaced by those of another culture. This method 
of cultural conflict is often referred to as one of the (intended or unintended) effects 
of globalization (Ritzer, 2004). Thus, (i) deliberate cultural oppression and (ii) peaceful 
cultural replacement (often driven by the economy) must be distinguished as separate 
forms of cultural conflicts. Both can take place slowly or rapidly and more-or-less 
systematically.
The concept of cultural conflicts involves another notion that is highly relevant here: 
cultural boundaries. The notion of cultural boundaries entails that different cultures form 
distinct entities with clear criteria for identity (Grathoff, Kłoskowska, 1994; Hannerz, 
2002). Those criteria are supposed to make different cultures unique and capable of being 
differentiated from each other. Consequently, insofar as different cultures are identifiable, 
they cannot be reduced to being equal one another, nor can they be amalgamated without 
losing their separate identities. However, the distinctness of cultures is open to debate 
because, for example, the distinguishing criteria for different cultures are negotiable and 
tradition-dependent rather than necessary and universally accepted. Accordingly, defining 
cultural boundaries is not like doing mathematics, where there is only one correct answer, 
but rather cultural boundaries are interest- and perspective-dependent, and even arbitrary 
to some extent (Elder-Vass, 2012, pp. 162–163, 171–173).
However, despite this vagueness, cultural boundaries have often been considered to 
be like walls that cannot be broken or crossed easily, because such crossing or breaking 
would require “intercultural learning” or “cultural acclimatization” in a kind of interim 
space (frontier or “brackish water”) between cultures. However, under certain conditions 
the learning is possible, meaning that people are able to interact and approach different 
cultures with tolerance and a benevolent curiosity. Activating this ability requires empathy 
and metacognitive skills such as interpreting, self-reflection, and help seeking.
It is also important to remember that borders and boundaries not only separate 
people, or are potential causes of conflict, but borders also structure the world and make 
it comprehensible (Hannerz, 2002, p. 7; Douglas, 2003, p. 53). Thus, boundaries do not 
only demarcate, but also serve as sites of convergence—places that meet and connect. 
Therefore, cultural boundaries can be said to be axiomatic and become the basis for 
cultural knowledge.
Herein is worth considering the concept of borders in a  greater detail. Firstly, 
a border always has two sides—inside and outside, top and bottom, left and right, past 
and future—that can be concrete (spatio-temporal) or abstract (conceptual), and sharp or 
fuzzy to different degrees (O’Neill, 2016, p. 2). Consequently, a bordered entity (such as, 
paradigmatically, a solid matter) can have both an inner surface and an outer surface, and 
the surface can either prevent or promote the transfer of elements from inside and outside. 
Supposing that cultures are discrete and internally unified entities (which is something 
that is questioned in this article), what is outside a culture is either another culture or 
a frontier (“uncivilized wilderness”). Cultures as bounded entities can then either absorb 
influences from other cultures or can prevent foreign influences from entering. Moreover, 
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what is considered to be the inside and outside, or the past and future, of a culture 
depends on point of view of the observer and, among other things, on her or his cultural 
and historical context. It is basically in this sense that cultural boundaries are perspectival.
Secondly, the fact that a border has two sides entails an important epistemological 
argument. For example, verifying the border of a country requires observing both sides 
of that border (e.g., in a map, photo or nature). Thus, observing the border requires 
a suitable point of view of examination. This requirement also concerns abstract borders 
such as cultural and conceptual boundaries. In the case of identifying cultural boundaries 
(and more generally, in the case of cultural comparisons), this brings along the fact that 
cultures are not the final meaning horizons of understanding, but that there must be 
a point of view that transcends the horizons of individual cultures and related language 
games (note that language is the most important cultural system because it mediates all 
the others). According to Karl-Otto Apel, different language games can be examined 
together in a  language-game that is transcendental to them and that concerns the 
general and relatively constant requirements of the determination of meaning related 
to the structures of human life (Apel, 1973, p. 256; cf. the concept of “The Common 
Behavior of Mankind” in Philosophical Investigations § 206, Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 70e). 
Charles Taylor (1989, pp. 19–21, 78), in turn, claims that although the content of each 
interpretative framework is specific and particular, it is universal as an interpretative form 
(i.e., as a form that interprets human experiences, deeds, emotions, and desires). Thus, 
Taylor is more cautious than Apel regarding the assumption of a universal content of the 
framework of interpretation. Yet, both authors lend support to the view that different 
cultures—as different horizons of understanding and frameworks of interpretation—
can be meaningfully (though not exhaustively) compared and transcended in a unifying 
framework that provides a ground for intercultural learning.
The concept of intercultural learning includes not only the knowledge exchange 
between cultures and the transfer of cultural content and values, but also skills (such as 
language skills, cultural empathy, and perception) and tools (i.e., concepts, metaphors, 
models, theories, and frameworks) required for such learning. Diverse skills and tools 
are also required for a general understanding of what culture is, including which facts 
are cultural and which are not, and in what sense and in what way different cultures can 
encounter one another.
The highest form of intercultural learning relates to the conditions under which the 
breaking of cultural norms is tolerable and making amends for cultural transgressions 
is appropriate. Recognizing such lenient conditions helps to increase the possibilities of 
a peaceful coexistence of different cultures. The conditions can include foreigners’ sincere 
ignorance of cultural norms, the high social and epistemological status of the person 
who breaks a cultural norm, the personal tolerance of the persons involved, and special 
occasions (such as the celebration of a foreign culture’s festival in the middle of another 
culture—in which cases there may be more leeway in terms of cultural norms of both 
cultures). These and other relevant conditions form the basis for reconstructive dealings 
with cultural conflicts. The required measures include efforts for positive interaction 
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between people regardless of their cultural background, considerate effort for discussing 
cultural transgressions and other problems related to cultural encounters, showing regret, 
apologizing, saying that the purpose was not to offend, and showing a general sympathetic 
attitude to the traditions of other people. The skill of using these and other related 
measures can be regarded as the highest form of cultural knowledge.
The dichotomy between culture and nature has often been seen as crucial in the 
understanding of what culture is. That dichotomy means, among other things, that culture 
and nature are interrelated, so that culture is anything that is not nature and nature is 
anything that is not man-made and has not been manipulated by humans. Thus, culture 
is based on human agency, whereas nature is not. This opinion has been problematized 
and powerfully questioned by authors such as Judith Butler and Timothy Morton. They 
consider nature as a human invention and the result of human conceptualization and 
demarcation (Butler, 1990; Morton, 2007, 2010, 2013). In their view, the difference between 
culture and nature disappears, or is, at least, relativized. Whatever our final opinion of 
the dichotomy between culture and nature may be, the dichotomy has heuristic relevance, 
leading us to motivate and define our concept of culture. Such defining also helps to 
distinguish between different cultures, which is an important task for cultural studies. 
Therefore, we need at least an initial idea of what culture is in general and how it works.
As is well known, many definitions of culture have been set forth, but two main types 
are most commonly referred to: substantive and functional. Substantive definitions focus 
on what culture is, whereas functional definitions try to explain what culture does. The 
difference between these two is not necessarily clear cut, even more so because many 
definitions define the essence of culture through the functions of culture (Lehtonen, 
2015, p. 48). An example of this is the definition presented by Dave Elder-Vass. According 
to him, culture consists of institutionalized practices and artefacts that convey decipherable 
meanings relating to life and the world (Elder-Vass, 2012, pp. 38–39). Culture is thus 
a shared set of practices and objects, and culture creates and maintains meanings and 
understandings. Existence of those different types of definitions of culture demonstrate 
the underlying fact that cultures are social constructions and their constituent elements 
can be chosen and determined in various ways. Accordingly, cultural boundaries are 
constructed and, to some extent, imaginary—not inherent or natural.
Cultural encounters
By referring above to Achebe’s novel, (i) deliberate cultural oppression and 
(ii) peaceful cultural replacement were distinguished as the main forms of cultural 
conflicts. Apparently, cultural encounters can also take place without conflict which is 
something to be expected insofar as cultural boundaries are artificial, imaginary, and 
subject to change. These non-conflicting (or not necessarily conflicting) means of cultural 
encounters include the following:
1) Individuals and groups with different cultural backgrounds (e.g. original population, 
immigrants, exchange students, expats, tourists) occasionally meet each other, ask 
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each other various questions, get to know one another, and share things about one 
another’s culture.
2) Different traditions (such as various religions and livelihoods) and their adherents and 
representatives (i.e., cultural majorities and minorities) live side by side—for example, 
in the same city or country—and have practical dealings (e.g., businesses, administra-
tion, and other activities) with one another on a regular basis.
3) Cultural events (like concerts, art exhibitions, and dance performances) gather and 
blend examples of different cultures’ art and artefacts (e.g., dance, music, paintings, 
theatre, architecture).
4) An artefact or work of art, such as a novel, painting, sculpture, garment, dance, or 
building, combines elements and styles from different cultures and traditions.
5) Schoolchildren, students and other people learn during lessons about cultures; they 
read books, articles, and blogs, see movies and documentary films, and listen to radio 
programs presenting various cultures.
6) A visible manifestation of an alien culture is erected in the middle of another culture 
(for example, a mosque is built in the middle of a Christian city).
7) Scholars study and classify different cultures and present their research results to 
academic and other audiences. (Lehtonen, 2015, pp. 48–49.)
Based on this in-no-way comprehensive list, we can conclude that basic forms of 
cultural encounters are (i) personal and (ii) non-personal. That is, they are (i) encounters 
between individuals and groups with different cultural backgrounds, and (ii) encounters 
with non-personal manifestations and representations of different cultures (manifestations 
that are naturally created, experienced, and thought by people).
Another common assumption, in addition to cultural conflicts and boundaries, is that 
cultures overlap or intersect in regard to some of their constituent elements. The nature of 
this overlap remains unclear, unless it simply means that the same traditions and practices 
can exist simultaneously in different cultures. In the light of this, cultures are hybrids 
consisting of elements from different historical periods and geographical areas, and some 
elements such as traditions and customs can exist in different cultures. For example, 
Islam and Christianity are traditions of various past and present cultures. There are many 
examples of cultural hybrids that work well even if they consist of conflicting interests and 
agendas. Modern examples are the combination of market and state-planned economies 
in China, as well as the combination of secularization and new forms of religiosity in 
the West.
Elder-Vass asks whether the boundaries of culture can be defined objectively even 
though cultures intersect, meaning that they may have one or many practices, habits, 
and traditions in common (Elder-Vass, 2012, pp. 162–163, 171–173). His answer is that 
intersection makes defining cultural boundaries inevitably arbitrary. As a  result, one 
person places two or more practices in the same culture, while another person places 
them in different cultures. Furthermore, even when some practices really are unique 
to the culture concerned, there is something arbitrary about choosing those practices 
rather than others to define that culture (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 171). Thus, a greater or 
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lesser discretion exists affecting the definitions of culture. Therefore, cultures are very 
far from being natural aspects of the practices that constitute them. Quite the contrary, 
a culture is in some respects a purely nominalist category of practices. Thus, what unites 
the practices that constitute a culture, and excludes others, is nothing more than the fact 
that the constituent practices have been labelled as components of that particular culture. 
In view of this, it is tempting to see cultures as a product of discursive construction. 
Nevertheless, the practices and traditions that are bundled into cultures exist objectively 
and independently of the cultural labels attached to them. However, the idea that the 
practices and traditions collectively form a culture is purely the result of naming them as 
such. Elder-Vass emphasizes that such naming only becomes effective when it is collective 
(i.e., when there is a group of people prepared to endorse and enforce it) (Elder-Vass, 
2012, pp. 171–172). So, if something about cultures is illusory and socially constructed, 
there is also something real, namely actual social groups promoting actual social norms 
(Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 54). It can also be said that diachronically, cultures are the outcome 
of a causal process in which people influence one another. Synchronically, cultures depend 
upon the existence of socially coordinated beliefs and dispositions in the members of 
the group concerned (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 172). Elder-Vass concludes the following: 
“Cultures, then, are nominal rather than objective categories of practices and they are 
socially constructed, but they are nevertheless real in the sense that they are endorsed 
and enforced by actual social entities” (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 173).
Based on this view, cultural hybrids can be defined as cultures, practices, and artefacts 
that combine styles and elements (e.g., traditions, designs, and ways of thinking) from 
different cultures (Douglas, 1996). Furthermore, cultural hybridity and multiculturalism 
belong together as both refer to societies in which various ethnic groups and cultures live 
together. Many, even the most modern and ancient cultures are hybrids and multicultural 
in this sense, and only a  few very isolated, small, and idiosyncratic cultures can be 
considered to be non-hybrid and monocultural.
Even if cultural hybridity, as defined above, may seem to be an obvious fact, Elder-
Vass surprisingly points out that the concept of cultural hybridity is perhaps internally 
contradictory, and thus impossible. This astonishing conclusion is due to the fact that 
cultural hybridity is a phenomenon that is only possible if we have distinct cultures to start 
with and yet its very occurrence undermines the distinctness of cultures (Elder-Vass, 2012, 
p. 170). In my opinion, the lesson here is that cultural hybridity must be understood as 
a dual phenomenon with internal and external aspects. An example of internal hybridity, 
or complexity, is the fact that even uniform national cultures are composed of many 
elements, practices and artefacts and are thus not simple and plain. Different traditions 
and practices of a culture can be copied or adapted to other cultures. Furthermore, cultural 
variation—in the sense of different groups of people following (slightly or markedly) 
different rules—can exist even inside one and the same culture. In external hybridity 
at least some of the elements of a culture originated from another culture. This dual 
nature of hybridity can be paralleled by the distinction between open systems, which allow 
interactions between their internal elements and the environment, and closed systems 
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which are isolated from their environment (Bertalanffy, 1969, pp. 39–41). Similarly, 
cultural hybrids can be open or closed. External cultural hybridity requires interactions 
between cultures (or between “open cultural systems”), whereas internal cultural hybridity 
(or a “closed cultural system”) does not. Furthermore, the dual nature of cultural hybridity 
goes together with the two main ways of crossing cultural boundaries: (i) breaking or 
transcending the norms of one’s own culture and (ii) breaking or transcending the norms 
of another culture.
In spite of cultural transfer and mixing, some people consider different cultures to 
be incompatible with one another for ethical, religious, national, aesthetic, or other 
normative factors. For this reason, among others, the crossing of cultural boundaries 
may be considered trespassing. Likewise, factual reasons can be the basis for considering 
different cultures incompatible. Such reasons include different basic beliefs, ways of 
life, customs and practices, as well as different social systems advanced and followed in 
different cultures. Behind factual reasons, there are often, however, some norm-related 
reasons. A normative reason why cultures have been considered to be incompatible is the 
idea of cultural purity (i.e., a cleansing of culture from the poisoning of outside influences) 
which is important within totalitarian systems and national ideologies (Douglas, 1966). 
The idea of cultural purity and the related idea of incompatibility of cultures are, however, 
problematic for both ethical and factual reasons. For example, how would the Finnish 
tradition of going to sauna on Saturdays and the British habit of five o’clock tea conflict 
with each other? While these traditions belong to different national cultures, they in no 
way exclude each other, but could be combined; one can very well have both sauna and 
tea. Even if this is true, one might point out that the sauna and the tea traditions exemplify 
other, more deep-rooted differences between the British and Finnish cultures, and that 
some of the differences may be incompatible. The more categorical and unconditional 
a cultural norm is, the more likely it will conflict with the norms of another culture. 
Such norms are often related to religion and social hierarchies (one could point out, for 
example, that Britain is still much more a class society than the rest of Europe). However, 
even if certain cultural norms are inconsistent with the norms of another culture, different 
cultures can well coexist in peace and harmony insofar as their specific norms are taken to 
be binding only for their own members, and insofar as people tolerate those who follow 
different cultural norms than they do. In this respect, cultural, religious, and political 
converts are often less tolerated than those who are natural-born members of a foreign 
culture. For example, in the West, many people have a negative attitude toward Westerners 
who have converted to Islam—often more negative than toward natural-born Muslims. 
This indicates that cultural apostasy and convertism are considered to violate strong 
group norms and values, such as esteem of one’s own culture and loyalty to one’s own 
group. This is further highlighted by the fact that in some religious traditions, apostasy is 
criminalized and even punishable by death.
The strangeness that people may feel in a culture other than their own also plays 
a role here. A feeling of strangeness or unfamiliarity is, however, always relative, and can 
quickly melt away through learning and social interaction. Thus, cultural unfamiliarity 
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does not necessarily need to lead to an actual (personal or social, mental or physical) 
conflict. Quite the contrary, cultural distance and strangeness can be a magnet, drawing 
positive interest to a foreign tradition and its representatives. The whole tourist industry, 
among other examples.
Norm circles as the creators and maintainers of cultures
Collective agents that generate, intentionally or unintentionally, boundaries between 
different cultures and thus separate them from one another are what Elder-Vass calls norm 
circles. According to him, cultures are composed of complexes of mutually referencing 
and supporting norms that are advanced by the corresponding norm circles (Elder-Vass, 
2012, pp. 166, 255). Norm circle can be defined as the group of people who are committed 
to endorsing and enforcing a particular norm (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 22). Rules, for their 
part, are norms that have been verbalized and communicated (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 48). 
Each norm has its own circle, and the membership of these norm circles may differ. The 
membership of norm circles may also overlap. Furthermore, Elder-Vass contends that 
culture is produced by specifically cultural norm circles (Elder-Vass 2012, pp. 30, 54). 
Specifically cultural refers to the norms that regulate the practices and customs considered 
central and constitutive of a culture. However, in my opinion, this is a more complex issue 
than it may appear at first, as what is considered central and constitutive depends on the 
point of view, specifically, what is different for the insiders and the outsiders of a culture.
It is obvious that the commitment of the members of a norm circle to its norms can 
be conscious or unconscious, deliberate or automatic. Furthermore, what is especially 
important in norm circles as social groups is that they have the causal power to produce 
a  tendency in individuals to follow standardized practices (Elder-Vass, 2012, pp. 67, 
74, 254). If such standards are violated, which can easily happen to foreigners who are 
not familiar with another culture’s standards and values, a cultural clash in the form of 
a breach of a cultural norm can take place. Thus, cultural boundaries can be crossed 
in a negative way, meaning that cultural norms and values can be violated and remain 
unheeded which can cause strong irritation in the members of the culture concerned. 
However, violations of cultural norms can also be eye-opening to the members of the 
culture involved and can thus raise awareness and understanding of cultural differences 
and characteristics.
It is worth pointing out that no norm circle is completely isolated and impenetrable 
like a solid billiard ball. Instead, norm circles can be compared to soft, spongy balls with 
a flexible and porous surface that allows for an exchange between all sides. In the same 
vein, norm circles can be compared to bubbles in soap suds that yield against each other 
and can be clustered and merged together, or even nested inside each other. Similarly, 
different traditions and practices can be clustered and merged together to form new 
cultural constellations.
Based on the concept of a norm circle, an interim space between cultures can be 
understood to refer to the circumstances under which identifying, learning, comparing, 
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negotiating and reconciling between different norms and norm circles (i.e., representatives 
of different cultures) are possible. These activities firstly require suitable qualities of the 
persons involved, including tolerance, compassion, and an interest in other cultures and 
persons. Secondly, the interim space between cultures consists of knowledge of higher-
order norms and concepts that are necessary for the identification and categorization of 
different cultures and cultural norms. Such higher-order norms include the distinctions 
between different types of cultural practices, products, and values, as well as between 
essential and nonessential cultural differences. In addition, language translations of 
different cultural norms may be required and, therefore, among other reasons, language 
skills are necessary for people who work in intercultural and international settings. All of 
these together—a sympathetic attitude toward other cultures, language skills, and general 
cultural knowledge—form an interim space between cultures. Critically, one could remark 
that this interim space is a (meta-)culture of its own that is not neutral, but rather strongly 
influenced by Western standards of rationality and of cultural studies. However, even 
if this criticism is, at least, partly justified, it is not completely accurate. The interim 
space concerned does not need to be fixed, but rather can be open to various standards, 
practices, and traditions. Moreover, there can be different interim spaces between cultures 
(Lehtonen, 2015, p. 51).
We have seen that in Elder-Vass’s view cultures are said to be composed of norms that 
are advanced by norm circles (Elder-Vass, 2012, pp. 54, 166, 255). Thus, the essence of 
culture can be characterized, first, in terms of the norms that guide human behavior and 
practices and, second, in terms of the collective agent (norm circles, or the social form of 
norm source) that maintains and strengthens those norms. Accordingly, cultural conflicts 
can raise between norms or between norm circles. Cultural conflicts often concern 
different norms and rules that are recognized and followed by different individuals and 
groups. However, cultural conflicts can also raise among different norm circles, especially 
if those social groups are very self-important and power seeking. Thus, various norm 
circles can also create conflicts over their influence and authority, and not only over 
norms endorsed by them.
In conclusion, the most significant obstacles for and difficulties in cultural encounters 
are related firstly to different norms that are endorsed in different cultures, and secondly, 
to the collisions of interests between various norm circles that maintain and strengthen 
those norms. As far as I can see, the difficulties in cultural encounters concern cultural 
recognition and involvement rather than cognitive understanding of different cultural 
habits and traditions. This view is in line with the more general fact that it’s easier to 
learn to understand what an unfamiliar practice consists of than to adopt such a practice 
as part of one’s self-identity.
Types of cultural conflicts
When considered in greater detail, the following main types of cultural conflicts can 
be distinguished:
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1. Conflicts between individuals representing different cultures.
2. Conflicts between different practices, customs, and traditions originated in different 
cultures.
3. Conflicts between different cultural norms.
4. Conflicts between various norm circles behind cultural norms. (Lehtonen, 2015, p. 52.)
Thus, individuals and collectives, their practices and ways of thinking, and norms 
and norm circles can conflict with and challenge each other. However, by no means am 
I suggesting that all conflicts between people are due to their different cultural backgrounds 
or are related to different cultural norms. Therefore, we should add that a conflict of 
the first type mentioned above is truly cultural only if the conflict is based on one or 
another of the subsequent types of cultural conflicts. Fortunately, cultural conflicts are 
not inevitable, which is demonstrated by history’s many examples of different cultures and 
their representatives existing side by side peacefully and influencing each other positively 
(for example, the interaction between Islamic and Western philosophy in the medieval 
context). Basically, cultural conflicts can be avoided, firstly, by negotiating, reinterpreting, 
and harmonizing cultural norms, and secondly, by suitably limiting and containing the 
scope of conflicting norms (e.g., by restricting the manifestations of cultural identity only 
in private life). Thus, harmonization and considered limitation (“sectorization”) are the 
main pathways to a peaceful coexistence of cultures.
Cultural conflicts can cause different types of processes, including struggles for 
cultural hegemony, isolation and withdrawal from intercultural contacts, and changes 
in cultural norms. Could it then be put forward as a conceptual truth that changing the 
constitutive norms of a culture results in the transformation of that culture? This must be 
considered carefully, and the answer depends on what constitutive means. If constitutive 
means “held as important and central”, then we can very well conceive that the norms of 
a culture can remain unchanged even if their mutual status or significance changes. This 
is the case in the West, where religion continues to have a presence in societies while 
secularization has significantly progressed. Thus, what is considered to be important and 
worth pursuing in a culture can change from time to time and from one point of view to 
another, without necessarily resulting in a complete dissolution of certain cultural norms 
and traditions. However, if constitutive means “essential and necessary,” then changing the 
constitutive norms of a culture obviously results in the transformation of the essence of 
that culture.
Based on Elder-Vass’s view, one could say that to encounter and understand a culture 
in its own terms, the constitutive norms of that culture should be identified and recognized. 
However, such identification is dependent on our prior concept of culture. Thus, the 
identification of the constitutive norms of a culture is not a completely innocent act, 
but a subject to the prior identification of culture in general, and the particular culture 
concerned, specifically. Different pre-understandings of cultures are potential sources of 
cultural conflicts. For example, many people in the West are alleged to have a biased and 
negative pre-understanding of Islamic culture (and vice versa), and this pre-understanding 
is a potential source of conflict.
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What then does recognizing a culture mean in this context? It could mean something like 
“at least temporarily adopting a tradition in imagination, but not necessarily permanently 
assenting it.” However, a  looser view of the requirements for cultural recognition and 
understanding is also available. According to this looser view, the adoption of the norms of 
other cultures is not necessary for cultural encounters—not even in one’s imagination (i.e., 
it is not necessary to consider what it would be like to follow the norms of another culture). 
Rather, it is necessary to have a basically benevolent attitude toward other cultures and 
traditions and their representatives. It seems to me that the difference between imaginary 
adoption (in the sense of being able to feel empathy and to know what it would be like to 
belong to another culture) and a sympathetic attitude is not enormous here.
Different traditions and practices can be distinguished both conceptually and 
ontologically. This is seen in the fact that tradition, as a whole, does not necessarily 
perish if a practice that has been part of that tradition dies out. Consider, for example, 
changing farming traditions in different cultures (Lehtonen, 2015, p. 54). Traditions are, 
thus, historically changing collections of diverse practices, and different traditions may 
share many practices (Lehtonen, 2014a, pp. 89–90). According to Elder-Vass, a practice 
is only an element of culture when it is shared by a norm circle and when that group puts 
some sort of pressure on individuals to conform to it (Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 160). This 
pressure can be stronger or weaker. If the conforming pressure is strong, encounters with 
other cultures can be unconstructive and apt to end in nothing but collision (consider 
the “billiard ball” metaphor). However, a conflict does not necessarily need to develop, 
because a culture can also conform in its tolerant and sympathetic attitudes toward other 
(perhaps not-so-tolerant) cultures (consider the “soft balls and soap suds” metaphor). 
I call this attitude multi-attractedness (Lehtonen, 2014b, pp. 40–43).
The concept of multi-attractedness refers to the interest aroused by mutually competing 
alternatives that someone experiences in a situation of choice. The multi-attracted person 
responds to opposite and even mutually contradictory options as equally attractive and 
worthy of consideration. Such person can be drawn, for example, to the leftist and rightist 
ideas, to degrowth thinking or financial growth, and to religiousness and secularism as 
well. One might say that the strength of those who are multi-attracted lies in their ability 
to see different views “from the inside.” They understand opposites and are interested 
in them. This makes it possible to calmly deal with social issues without losing multi-
voicedness, a benefit when sitting down at the negotiating table to seek optimal solutions 
to complex problems, cultural problems included.
The perspective challenge
To get an even more detailed view of the metaphor of cultural boundaries it is 
recommended to examine the perspective challenge discussed by Alasdair MacIntyre. 
The perspective challenge questions the possibility of making universally valid truth 
claims from within any one tradition, since the very existence of rival traditions, each with 
different criteria for truth and falsehood, relativizes and challenges all truth claims. Thus, 
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the perspective challenge means that different people are epistemologically constrained 
and separated by different cultures and traditions. Therefore, perspectivists may argue 
that cultural boundaries are real and substantive, not imaginary.
The perspective challenge rests on the following line of reasoning: All people live 
within certain social and cultural traditions. They have grown into their own traditions, 
into their practices and institutions, into their systems of belief, and they have adopted 
their account of rationality. Their particular traditions are something they have accepted 
as given and not acquired as a result of individual choice. As partakers of traditions, 
they have no means of adopting general and timeless standards through which they 
could ascend above the particularity of their situation or that of others (MacIntyre, 2003, 
p. 350). MacIntyre crystallizes the essence of the perspective challenge as follows: “If 
there is a multiplicity of rival traditions, each with its own characteristic modes of rational 
justification internal to it, then that very fact entails that no one tradition can offer those 
outside it good reasons for excluding the theses of its rivals” (MacIntyre, 2003, p. 352).
The solution for perspectivists is thus to abandon the traditional meanings of “true” 
and “false” as taken to be universal and constant. Perspectivists also contend that, 
instead of seeing rival traditions as something exclusive and incompatible, they should 
be seen as different and complementary points of view concerning the realities they are 
addressing (MacIntyre, 2003, p. 352). For perspectivists, different traditions inhabit the 
same (physical) world but conceptualize and categorize it differently. It is as if different 
traditions form separate horizons of understanding from which general agreement 
and common standards of rationality are doomed to remain unattainable. Thus, if the 
perspectivists are right, different cultures are distinct from each other because of the 
different culturally determined perspectives of their representatives. One might say that 
the existence of different, culturally determined perspectives reinforces the notion of 
cultural boundaries.
Even though the perspectivists’ view may seem plausible, even compelling, MacIntyre 
(2003, p. 353) considers it to be fundamentally misconceived and misdirected. According 
to him, the proponents of the perspective challenge fail to see the possibility of learning 
an alien tradition from within as if it were one’s own tradition. This apparently requires 
“going native” or immersing oneself in an alien language as a “second first language”. 
MacIntyre elucidates this requirement by invoking anthropology: anthropologists who 
have resided among natives long enough have learned a foreign language as a “second 
first language” (or so it has been claimed). As a result, anthropologists have been able 
to translate and re-create the ideas and concepts of the natives’ tradition into their “first 
first language” (MacIntyre, 2003, p. 374). Such translations are successfully carried out if 
the participant in the native tradition identifies her or his own tradition in the translation 
(MacIntyre, 2003, p. 375). This requires (although MacIntyre does not say so himself) 
that both the translator (an anthropologist) and the evaluator of the translation (a native) 
master each other’s first language. Both persons should therefore be bilingual or should 
understand both the source and the target language. In the case of small languages, 
such competent translator/evaluator pairs may be rare, even non-existent, which may 
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temporarily prevent the evaluations of the validity of a  translation (which does not, of 
course, prevent the translation from being adequate).
Learning the language of an alien tradition as a second first language makes it feasible 
that one tradition not only disproves the views and practices of the other but the first 
tradition also views the second tradition as failure, according to its own standards of 
rationality and consistency. Recognizing such “successes” or “failures” of one’s own 
tradition does not require a universal or tradition-independent perspective. Instead 
the “success” or “failure” of a  tradition can be seen and identified in different ways 
from various tradition-bound perspectives. An example of this is the conflict between 
Galileo, a representative of modern natural science, and the Catholic Church. Finally, 
after centuries, the Church admitted that the heliocentric model of the solar system, 
proposed by Galileo and Copernicus is correct. One might say that, due to the Galileo 
affair, the Catholic Church has overcome its epistemological crisis by incorporating 
scientific principles and results into its world-view. Thus, the Church has increased its 
means of dealing with epistemological crises by adopting at least some scientific standards 
(MacIntyre, 2003, p. 365).
MacIntyre suggests that one tradition can defeat another in terms of its ability to solve 
various epistemic, ethical, or social problems. Such a defeat is possible if one tradition 
reaches a more advanced stage of development than another, and is able to prove this 
by overcoming views that have previously been held by both traditions, or by the rival 
tradition only. It follows that although no absolute or universal point of view exists, the 
perspective challenge is powerless against a tradition-bound form of inquiry that begins, 
but does not necessarily end, with received ideas, beliefs, and presuppositions of one’s 
own tradition (MacIntyre, 2003, pp. 364–368). This kind of inquiry can result in new 
ideas, beliefs, and presuppositions that might not have arisen otherwise. Therefore, newly 
originated ideas and understandings can also be new for the encountering cultures. This 
potential ability to create new understandings is one of the most important benefits of 
cultural encounters. Thus, according to MacIntyre, the boundaries between different 
cultures can be positively crossed and, through such crossings, intercultural learning can 
take place.
Therefore, for MacIntyre, the representatives of different cultures can benefit from 
points of view that differ from their own tradition-bound perspectives. For most people 
this takes place largely through translations and other second-hand information. Based on 
translations, books, and films, among other things, people may see that other cultures cope 
better or worse with some issues than their own culture does. Despite being perspectival, 
selective, and limited, such “insight” can still be realistic in the sense that it represents 
the reality of other cultures from the observer’s point of view.
Based on this reasoning, MacIntyre firmly rejects attempts to invoke and develop 
a  tradition-independent and universal form of inquiry. According to him, “It is an 
illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground […] which can afford 
rational resources sufficient for enquiry independent of all traditions” (MacIntyre, 2003, 
p. 367). The history of hermeneutics and cultural studies shows, however, that a good 
57Cultural boundaries
number of scholars—such as Karl-Otto Apel—have held the opposite view, on various 
grounds.
According to MacIntyre, the perspectivist “fails to recognize how integral the 
conception of truth is to tradition-constituted forms of enquiry” (MacIntyre, 2003, p. 367). 
This failure is accompanied by the supposition that it is possible to switch the point 
of view between different traditions. However, MacIntyre holds that the multiplicity of 
traditions does not mean multiple perspectives between which we could switch, but only 
that it provides “a multiplicity of antagonist commitments, between which only conflict 
[…] is possible” (MacIntyre, 2003, p. 368).
In my opinion, MacIntyre’s solution to the perspective challenge needs a major 
revision. The component analysis of the concept of a point of view presented in my earlier 
study (Lehtonen, 2014a) remedies the following problems in MacIntyre’s argument: 
(1) the presupposition that one is committed to a concept of rationality that allows for 
the possibility of one’s own tradition to err, and (2) the assumption that people are 
irrevocably tied to the commitments of their own traditions. The first presupposition is 
made more flexible and thus less problematic when one points out that the other does not 
necessarily need to be committed to a change of her or his point of view. For a member of 
a rigid religious or political tradition, for example, such a change of commitment may be 
an impossible option. Nonetheless, even an earnestly committed believer may be able to 
use her or his imagination to take some perspective-changing steps to pave the way for at 
least some understanding of another tradition. It is thus enough that one can imagine and 
understand what reality would look like if a component of one’s tradition and perspective 
were different from what it actually is. Thus, a loosening of the first assumption is obviously 
possible. It does not require an extraordinary power of imagination to understand what 
a change in point of view would mean for someone’s opinion.
Second, MacIntyre’s view of the traditions’ inability to complete each other is clearly 
overstated and, therefore, to be dismissed. Based on empirical evidence, we have strong 
reasons to believe, contrary to what MacIntyre says, that different traditions can complete 
and develop each other, at least as far as the individual components of their points of 
view are concerned. These components include: the observer; the observer’s spatial and 
temporal positions; the observer’s social, cultural, political, and economic positions; the 
observer’s mental attitude; the object and its features; the environment or context in which 
the object appears; observational instruments; the conceptual apparatus; the method or 
approach to viewing; and many other things. Thus, I defend the view that although it may 
be impossible to change all constituent elements of a point of view in one undertaking, at 
least some of them are changeable step by step (Lehtonen, 2014a, pp. 99–101). This view 
provides the basis for the conclusion that perspective-related and perspective-dependent 
cultural boundaries can be broken down, and that people can go through the process 
of learning new cultural skills and acquiring new cultural knowledge—thus cultural 
boundaries are changed through a gradual change of one’s own point of view.
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Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that cultural boundaries refer 
primarily to different social norms endorsed and enforced by various social groups called 
norm circles. Social norms govern different traditions, practices, customs, and ways 
of thinking that are considered to be characteristic of different cultures. The fact that 
different definitions of culture exist demonstrates the underlying facts that cultures are 
social constructions and their constituent elements can be chosen and determined in 
various ways. Cultural boundaries too are man-made but real in the sense that different 
cultural norms can conflict with each other, and different norm circles (or social groups) 
can disagree. The metaphor of boundaries is thus an appropriate tool for cultural studies, 
insofar as it helps to explain why cultural conflicts exist, and how cultural conflicts are 
related to the breaking of norms endorsed and enforced by different social groups. The 
metaphor of boundaries fits this task. With its help, different cultures and social groups can 
be structured and represented as distinct collective entities, yet with blurred and changing 
borders, that can side, collide, and overlap with each other. Different cultural norms 
do not, of course, only separate and repel, but can also attract and magnetize people. 
Furthermore, no culture is categorically closed to influences from other cultures. Instead, 
different cultural norm circles interact and can adopt traditions and practices from each 
other, upon which new cultural hybrids and innovations can originate. Therefore, different 
cultures can be compared, along with another related metaphor, to spongy soft balls and 
penetrable bubbles in soap suds rather than to solid billiard balls. The soap suds metaphor 
is suitable also because cultural boundaries are, to some extent, artificial and subject to 
change as different traditions can be clustered and merged together to form new cultural 
constellations. A peaceful crossing of cultural boundaries requires cultural exchange and 
a constant effort to genuinely understand other people’s points of view.
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 Pogranicza kulturowe 
Streszczenie
Autor artykułu stara się rozwikłać kwestię przedefiniowania granic kulturowych. Zadaje 
w związku z tym następujące pytania: 1) Do czego nawiązują granice kulturowe i z czego 
się składają? 2) Na jakich warunkach i w jakim zakresie zasadna jest metafora granic 
kulturowych? 3) Na jakich zasadach granice kulturowe mogą być łamane lub przekra-
czane? Zagadnienia te są rozważane na podstawie filozoficznej analizy, która czerpie 
z tekstów The Reality of Social Construction (2012) Dave’a Elder-Vassa oraz Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? (2003) Alasdaira MacIntyre’a. Metafora granic jest ważnym narzę-
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dziem do studiowania kultury, ponieważ pomaga wytłumaczyć, dlaczego różne zasady 
panują w różnych kulturach oraz jaki związek mają konflikty kulturowe z łamaniem tychże 
zasad utrzymywanych i wzmacnianych przez różnorodne grupy społeczne. Metafora granic 
pasuje do tego zadania, ponieważ z jej pomocą różne kultury i grupy społeczne mogą być 
ustrukturyzowane oraz postrzegane jako odmienne byty kolektywne, jednak z zacierają-
cymi się i zmieniającymi się granicami, mogą one także się wspierać, wchodzić w konflikt 
lub przenikać się ze sobą.
Słowa kluczowe: granica kulturowa, konflikt kulturowy, spotkanie kulturowe, krąg norm, 
uczenie się międzykulturowe
